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Abstract
Fire sales and default contagion are two of the main drivers of systemic risk in financial
networks. While default contagion spreads via direct balance sheet exposures between insti-
tutions, fire sales describe iterated distressed selling of assets and their associated decline in
price which impacts all institutions invested in these assets. That is, institutions are indirectly
linked if they have overlapping asset portfolios. In this paper, we develop a model that helps
us understand the joint effect of the two contagion channels and investigate structures of
financial systems that promote or hinder the spread of an initial local shock. We first con-
sider the contagion process for an explicitly given system and then derive our main results
for random ensembles of systems whose macroscopic statistical characteristics of defining
parameters are close to each other. In particular, we model direct exposures by means of a
random graph. Our approach ensures robustness to local uncertainties and changes in the sys-
tem. We characterize resilient and non-resilient system structures by criteria that can be used
by regulators to assess system stability. Moreover, we provide explicit capital requirements
that secure the financial system against the joint impact of fire sales and default contagion.
Keywords Systemic risk · Financial contagion · Asset fire sales · Price-mediated
contagion · Default contagion · Capital requirements
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1 Introduction
Today’s financial networks are characterized by various types of dependencies between finan-
cial institutions and a complex network structure. While these connections go along with
attractive business opportunities for each single institution, they also bear the risk of spread-
ing and amplifying local shocks through large parts of the system, which is known as systemic
risk. A particular challenge is to study the interplay andmutual reinforcement of various types
of contagious connections. Two of the main drivers of systemic risk that we focus on in this
paper are the contagion channels default contagion and fire sales (see [28] for instance).
Default contagion describes insolvency transmission between direct neighbors in a finan-
cial network due to the inability to meet financial obligations. That is, if a certain bank has
to declare bankruptcy and hence cannot (fully) repay loans or other pending liabilities, then
all exposed institutions in the system have to write off their losses and can get into financial
distress themselves. Although default contagion takes place between direct neighbours in
the network, it was one of the main insights from the financial crisis that also second order
effects play an important role when assessing an institution’s stability with respect to certain
shock events. This is the main difference of systemic risk as compared to classical counter-
party risk: not only an institution’s contractual partners are important but also their business
connections and so on, which the first institution has no influence on or even knowledge of.
The contagion channel fire sales describes a similar effect: it can happen if for some
reason one or more investors sell off a large number of shares of a certain illiquid asset which
causes a decrease in the asset’s share-price. Hence, by mark-to-market of portfolio values,
this leads to losses for all institutions invested in the asset and thus possibly causes further
asset sales in order to comply with external regulations or internal strategies. This on the
other hand drives down prices even further and the cycle of fire sales goes on and on. In
contrast to default contagion, fire sales can transmit distress from one institution to another
even without a direct business relationship. Each institution that holds an asset portfolio of
some kind is then exposed to all other institutions with a (partially) overlapping portfolio.
However, due to second order effects, institutions can even be exposed to other institutions
without having any overlapping asset holdings. In contrast to default contagion, fire sales
can start while all institutions in the network are still solvent but some of them choose to sell
assets either voluntarily or because of regulatory requirements.
Clearly, the two described effects can further amplify each other. If, for instance, during a
fire sales cascade an institution goes bankrupt, as described above its creditors have to write
off their loss and may be driven into selling parts of their asset portfolio thus sparking further
fire sales. The underlying motivation for this paper is thus to model the interplay of default
contagion and fire sales and particularly to understand which structures of direct exposures
and overlapping asset portfolios promote or prevent the spread of local stress in a system.
1.1 Related work
One of the first papers to rigorously address contagion effects in financial networks was
the seminal work by Eisenberg and Noe [20]. In its original form their model (the EN-
model) describes the channel of default contagion without bankruptcy costs and under a
perfect claim enforcement technology. The main insight was the existence (and sometimes
uniqueness) of a payment vector that clears liabilities in an explicitly given interbank network.
The popularity of the EN-model is partly due to its tractability which allows for a number of
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extensions including for example default costs, fire sales and crossholdings between banks
(see [12,24,32,34]).
Other lines of research addressed the questionwhich network structures promote a cascade
of defaults. For example the authors in [1,2] compare stylized network structures, the ring
and complete network. They show that complete networks can absorb small shocks better
but large shocks are amplified. The authors of [9] present a more general framework that
allows to compare a larger set of network structures, including the empirically relevant core-
periphery network. In addition, in contrast to previous studies they account for the presence
of bankruptcy cost. Their main insight is that for highly capitalized systems amore diversified
network structure is better, while for poorly capitalized systems diversification can be harmful
and create potential for larger amplification of bankruptcy cost.
Another line of research, which started in [23] and continued for example in [16,17,19],
uses asymptotic random graph techniques. Similarly to [1,2,9], the objective is to gain under-
standing of which network structures promote systemic risk and which capital requirements
are suitable to prevent large cascades. Rather than considering a concrete network configu-
ration, these works derive results for a whole family of random graph configurations whose
macroscopic statistical characteristics are calibrated to resemble an originally observed struc-
ture. That is, statements about the final state of the system are possible in terms of global
statistical quantities only, and independent of the precise structure on a microscopic level;
this makes this approach robust to local uncertainties as well as changes over time and thus
attractive from a regulatory perspective. Moreover, for large systems a natural notion of
resilience emerges that is not based on any arbitrarily chosen parameters, but considers an
arbitrarily small initial shock and its effect on the global system.
In terms of fire sales [25] consider an economy consisting of multiple banks and multiple
assets with different liquidity levels to study first order effects of fire sales (the asset sales of
one bank creates a balance sheet hit to another bank only if it holds the same asset). In [10]
the authors introduce a systemicness matrix to quantify the aggregated effects of liquidation
when banks hold overlapping portfolios. Their analysis includes the impact of second order
effects. Using a large system approach [18] proposes a model for fire sales that also accounts
for higher order effects. The authors derive asymptotic results about the fraction of finally
defaulted institutions, the number of sold asset shares and the ensuing final price impact.
Also see [8] for a similar albeit much simpler framework for investigating fire sales on a
random network by a branching process approximation.
While the asymptotic methods line of research accomplishes to characterize favorable and
unfavorable system structures, it has so far only been possible tomodel one contagion channel
at a time. It is the aim of this paper to present the first integrated model for default contagion
and fire sales that uses the asymptotic approach to provide insight into the effect of certain
structural characteristics on system stability. In an Eisenberg–Noe setting this integration has
been done in [12] and in [34]. In [5] the authors endogenize possible intervention to stop
contagion that propagates through fire sales and default losses.
1.2 Contribution
In this paper we study the joint effects of default contagion and fire sales and their impact on
system stability as well as systemic risk management.
Integrated model for default contagion and fire sales Our main objective in this paper is
to specify and study a stochastic network model for default contagion and fire sales. To
prepare the ground for such a model, we first state a deterministic model for simultaneous
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default contagion and fire sales such that in particular the two can amplify each other. At this
we assume the following underlying parameters for each institution i ∈ [n] = {1, . . . , n}:
Its initial capital ci , which is reduced by some individual exogenous shock i , a list of
direct exposures (e j,i ) to other institutions j such that i’s capital is reduced by e j,i if j
defaults, and a vector xi = (x Ai ) of numbers of shares held of each asset A. In addition every
institution is assigned sale functions ρAi that abstractly describe asset sales of each asset A
due to regulation or other constraints as institution i incurs losses. The sale functions are
allowed to vary across different institutions, as for example hedge funds, investment banks
or commercial banks might have a very different asset sales behaviour, and asset classes,
for example in order to distinguish between sales of assets with different liquidity levels.
Lastly, a function hA is given that specifies the impact of sales on asset A’s price—assuming
that exogenous price changes are negligible during the contagion process and hA is the sole
driver of the asset price. We only require minimal assumptions on ρAi (non-decreasing) and
hA (continuous and non-decreasing) to derive our first result about the set of finally defaulted
institutions and the vector of finally sold shares in terms of a fixed point equation. In addition
we assign to each institution i ∈ [n] a value si of systemic importance. This value does not
influence the contagion process but allows for a more refined risk analysis based on the set
of finally defaulted institutions after a cascade.
The stochastic model The previously mentioned results allow us to compute the final damage
to any explicitly given financial system. The actual focus of this paper, however, is to go one
step further and to model a whole ensemble of systems simultaneously to understand which
structural properties in a system expedite or inhibit the spread of distress. More precisely, we
aimat performing an asymptotic analysis for a financial system that inherits themodel features
andflexibility of our deterministicmodel.Ourmodel for the financial system exhibits a degree
of flexibility and heterogeneity to capture observed features thatwas previously unseenwithin
the literature on asymptotic random graph models for systemic risk. We achieve this by the
following means:
1. We randomly rewire direct links in the network according to the following method: We
assign to each institution i a type αi out of finitely many types [T ] := {1, . . . , T }. Insti-
tutions of the same type share a certain similarity, for example they could be residing in
the same geographical region, be of a similar institutional type or in the same layer of a
tired network such as core-periphery. Classification of certain institutions as systemically





i , α ∈ [T ] and draw a random link from i to another institution




j . That is, w
±,α
i describe
the tendency of i to send/receive links from institutions with certain types. They can be
calibrated to the observed in-/out-degree in a concrete network configuration. We refer
to Sect. 6 for details on the estimation of the parameters. This set of parameters ensures
that important statistical properties of this random graph are in line with observed real
financial networks with a complex tired structure especially on a global level. While
in some countries a power law or core/periphery degree sequence was observed (see
[14]), one degree sequence is not enough to describe networks consisting of different
subnetworks. For a global perspective it is essential to model also connections between
different subsystems in a flexible way. The combination of finitely many types and a con-
tinuum of possible weights does exactly the job of delivering realistic network skeletons
on which default contagion processes can still be described by finite dimensional fixed
point equations. This idea was developed in [17] for a pure default contagion analysis.
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The empirical distribution of parameters (weights and types) is assumed to be close in
distribution to a multidimensional random vector (W−,W+, A).
2. The parameter vector (W−,W+, A) is then complemented by random components
describing the empirical distribution of systemic importance, capital, exogenous loss and
asset holdings. This leads to (W−,W+, X, S,C, L, A) as the parameter of our financial
system. We only pose a first moment restriction on (W−,W+, X, S,C, L, A) and in
particular allow for all kind of possible dependencies between the components. We then
consider a whole ensemble of financial systems with parameters close in distribution to
(W−,W+, X, S,C, L, A).
For the stochastic systemwe derive similar results as for the explicit system about the fraction
of finally defaulted institutions and the vector of finally sold asset shares. The following
informal statement summarises the main insights from Theorem 3.3.
Mock theorem Consider a financial system of size n ∈ N that was hit by some exogenous
shock. Let M ∈ N denote the number of assets in the system. Then under certain regularity
assumptions there exist constants 0 ≤ k0 ≤ K0 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ km ≤ Km < ∞, 1 ≤ m ≤ M,
such that
k0 + op(1) ≤ number of finally defaulted institutions
n
≤ K0 + op(1),
km + op(1) ≤ number of finally sold shares of asset m
n
≤ Km + op(1),
where op(1) denotes a term that vanishes as n becomes large. The constants k0, K0, km, Km
can be computed explicitly in terms of the global system statistics, and in many relevant
settings k0 = K0, km = Km,m ≤ M.
For large systems we thus derive explicit lower and upper bounds for the fraction of finally
defaulted institutions and sold shares triggered by some initial shock. Moreover, the upper
and lower bounds coincide inmost cases and then our results allow to determine the quantities
exactly. The bounds are robust to local changes and are thus suitable to understand the effect
of certain structural characteristics of the network and in particular the joint impact of default
contagion and fire sales on system stability.
An asymptotic analysis is justifiable by the fact that a large number of institutions (funds,
investment banks, insurance companies, etc.) are participating in the financial system. Addi-
tionally we test the analytic results with a simulation study, which shows that systems of
reasonable size are well approximated by our analytic results.
For the proofs we can partly resort to results from [16–18]. Still the combination of both
channels poses a number of new technical challenges. In the pure contagion model one
can use so called finitary systems, i.e. systems where the characterizing parameter vector
in Item 2. above only takes finitely many values, to approximate default contagion in more
general systems (see [16,17,19]). These finitary systems can be well understood by means
of the differential equation method (see [35]). However, once fire sales are included, finitary
systems pose some discontinuity issues and thus require new techniques, which we develop
here.
Risk management As already mentioned before, our asymptotic approach entails the advan-
tage of a natural notion of resilience. More particularly, we consider arbitrarily small initial
shocks and use our main result for the stochastic model to determine whether the resulting
fraction of finally defaulted institutions vanishes or remains bounded away from 0.We derive
explicit criteria for regulators to determine the stability of a financial system and we demon-
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strate in an example that resilience can heavily depend on the joint impact of default contagion
and fire sales. This specifically underlines the importance of an integrated modelling.
Moreover, based on the resilience criteria we show for a class of financial systems how
to determine sufficient capital requirements to ensure stability. The regulated institutions
themselves can easily calculate these capital requirements after a regulator announces a few
global parameters—they are thus very transparent. Further, as the capital requirements only
depend on global parameters and the bank’s own business decisions (its balance sheet) they
are inherently fair and cannot be manipulated.
1.3 Outline
In Sect. 2, we state our model for the financial system and the contagion process. We then
state and explain our main result for the stochastic model in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we derive
criteria for financial networks to be (non-)resilient with respect to small initial shocks. We
then apply them to obtain sufficient capital requirements in Sect. 5 and carry out a simulation
study to show that our results are applicable for large finite networks and to demonstrate
the joint impact of default contagion and fire sales. In Sect. 6 we discuss estimation of the
model before we conclude with a discussion including the limitations of the model in Sect. 7.
In Sect. 8, we provide proofs for all the results. Finally, we provide a glossary listing all
important symbols, parameters and functions for our model.
2 An integratedmodel for the financial system
In this section, we state our model for a financial system. It includes all the parameters we
need to investigate the interplay of the contagion channels fire sales and default contagion.
We assume that there are n ∈ N financial institutions.We use the term financial institutions in
a wide sense. It may include banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, asset managers but
also non-financial institutions, as for example corporations if they hold a large number of the
assets and would sell them in case of a decline in value. We denote the set of institutions by
[n] := {1, . . . , n}. Further we consider M ∈ N assets. These are the assets institutions invest
in and that are considered relevant for potential fire sales. We denote by [M] := {1, . . . , M}
the set of these assets.
2.1 Model parameters
Each institution i ∈ [n] has a set of parameters assigned:
1. The value of systemic importance si ∈ R+,0: It describes the potential damage that a
default of institution i will cause for the global financial system or the wider economy.
For example, if institution i ∈ [n] is crucial in providing certain payment infrastructure
it would have a higher value si assigned than a bank that is not offering such service. See
[19] for more details and possible choices for si .
2. The initial capital parameter ci ∈ R+,∞ := R+ ∪ {∞}: This parameter determines the
monetary buffer of institution i against losses. For banks this is usually their equity (assets
minus liabilities), which is positive if the bank is solvent. For low leverage institutions,
such as mutual and money market funds, it could the total value of assets managed. In
the following, we refer to ci as capital for simplicity.
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Fig. 1 Model parameters for
institutions i and j in the financial
system as well as asset m
asset m
price impact function hm
shares xmi
institution i institution j
systemic importance si
exposure ei,j−−−−−−−−→ systemic importance sj
capital ci
exposure ej,i←−−−−−−−− capital cj
exogenous loss i exogenous loss j




3. The exogenous loss parameter i ∈ R+,0: It models the impact of some external shock
on institution i . The specification of i allows for a variety of stress tests for the financial
system, i.e. asset price shock, defaults of some institutions, etc. The actual magnitude of
i will thus crucially depend on the stress testing and the business model of institution i .
The actual new capital of institution i after the shock is ci − i .
4. The number xmi ∈ R+,0 of shares institution i holds of asset m ∈ [M]: As we are only
interested in the effect of sales, we consider only positive holdings. If an institution i
is shortening asset m, we set xmi = 0. So for each institution we can assign a vector
xi := (x1i , . . . , xMi ) ∈ RM+,0 of asset holdings.
5. Direct exposures ei, j ∈ R+,0: In this section, we consider ei, j to be the observed (deter-
ministic) exposure of j to i . If ei, j > 0, this means that institution i owes a monetary
amount to institution j via for example a loan. In the next section, we will propose a
random model for {ei, j }i, j∈[n].
6. A sales function ρi : R+,0 → [0, 1]M : This function models the sales of asset 1, . . . , M
by institution i after it lost a certain fraction of its capital.
In Fig. 1 we summarize the parameters assigned to each institution.
2.2 Fire sales
Fire sales are the combinationof asset sales andprice impact. The exogenous losses i , i ∈ [n],
possibly drive some institutions into selling parts of their assets. This can be due to their own
risk preference or regulation that forces them to stay within certain risk bounds or leverage
constraints. We model these asset sales by vector valued functions ρi = (ρ1i , . . . , ρMi ) :
R+,0 → [0, 1]M , which describe the fraction of holdings of asset 1, . . . , M sold by institution
i after it lost a certain fraction of its capital, i.e. i ∈ [n] sells xmi ρmi (/ci ) of its shares of
assetm after it incurred losses of . The specification of ρi will crucially depend on the type
of institution (i.e. asset manager, investment bank, insurance company,…) and the respective
regulatory requirement. Allowing for different sales behavior for different institutions is thus
especially important if one goes beyond the banking network. Moreover, by allowing ρi to
be vector valued, we account for the fact that financial institutions might follow a certain
strategy when selling assets. For example theymight start with liquid assets first or try to keep
their overall market exposure.Wemake the following natural assumptions: the sale functions
ρi for i ∈ [n] are non-decreasing, ρi (0) = (0, . . . , 0) and ρi (u) = (1, . . . , 1) for all u ≥ 1.
Moreover to simplify notation in the following, we choose ρi to be right-continuous for every
i ∈ [n] and denote by ◦ρi (u) := limε→0+ ρi ((1 − ε)u) its left-continuous modification.
The sales will cause prices to go down because the assets are not perfectly liquid (the
limit order book has finite depth). To model the decline in the asset prices we use functions
hm : RM+,0 → [0, 1] which are non-decreasing and continuous in each coordinate. We
123
Mathematics and Financial Economics
assume that the share price of each asset m ∈ [M] decreases by hm( y) after nym ∈ R+,0
shares of assetm have been sold, where y = (y1, . . . , yM ). Each institution i ∈ [n] is further
assumed to suffer losses of xi · h( y) due to mark-to-market valuation of its portfolio, where
h( y) = (h1( y), . . . , hM ( y)).
There are two remarks in order: First, we pick y as the argument of h instead of the
actual vector of sold shares n y; this choice is purely conventional for any fixed n but will
be convenient for our results (also cf. Assumption 3.1). Second, as institutions start selling
assets during the contagion process, they actually reduce their exposure to future price drops
and xi · h( y) merely functions as an upper bound on i’s losses. In this sense our model is
conservative, andmoreover, this assumption allows for better analytic results in the following.
For a financial system without direct exposures, i.e. ei, j = 0 for all i, j ∈ [n], the
contagion process is then solely driven by rounds of alternating asset sales and price impact,
i.e. fire sales. Denoting by σ (k) = (σ 1(k), . . . , σ M(k)) the vector of sold shares in round k ∈ N0






i + xi · h(n−1σ (k−1))
ci
)
, k ≥ 1.
Here	 denotes the Hadamard (entry-wise) product of two vectors, while · denotes the scalar
product. See [18] for results on the pure fire sales process in a slightly more restricted setting.
2.3 Default contagion
If on the other hand, we consider a financial system with xi = 0 for all i ∈ [n], then
contagion completely proceeds via the direct exposure network. That is, if i ≥ ci and
institution i ∈ [n] is therefore initially defaulted, then each institution j ∈ [n] suffers losses
of ei, j . This possibly causes further defaults in the system and so on. Note that we suppose
a recovery rate of zero, which is a conservative yet reasonable assumption because the time
horizon of the default contagion process is short compared to the time the resolution of an
insolvent institution takes, and there is a huge amount of uncertainty about the actual value
of an insolvent institution immediately after its default. One could easily implement other
fixed recovery rates in our model.
Again we can consider the pure default contagion process in rounds. DenotingD(k) ⊆ [n]





⎩i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D(k−1)
e j,i ≥ ci − i
⎫
⎬
⎭ , k ≥ 1,
and the contagion process ends after atmost n−1 rounds. In particular,Dn := D(n−1) consists
of all finally defaulted institutions and Sn = ∑i∈Dn si amounts to the total final systemic
damage caused by defaults. See [3,16,17] for more results on the pure default contagion
process.
2.4 The contagion process
The focus of this section is on the understanding of the joint effects of fire sales and default
contagion.We therefore combine the two processes from above and again consider contagion
in rounds: Let D(0) = ∅ and σ (0) = 0 ∈ RM . Moreover, for k ≥ 1,
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D(k) =
{
i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D(k−1)


















ThenD(0) ⊆ D(1) ⊆ · · · ⊆ [n] andσ (0) ≤ σ (1) ≤ · · · ≤ ∑i∈[n] xi .Wecan thus conclude that
the process converges as k → ∞. Let then Dn := ⋃k∈N D(k) be the set of finally defaulted
institutions, Sn = ∑i∈Dn si their systemic importance and χn := n−1 limk→∞ σ (k) the
vector of finally sold shares divided by n.
Lemma 2.1 There exists a smallest solution (Dn,χn) to
D =
{
i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D












Moreover, Dn ⊆ Dn and χn ≤ χn.
The case thatDn  Dn or χn < χn can happen if in the contagion process the sold shares
converge to a vector that would be large enough to cause new defaults or trigger further asset
sales but is actually never reached in finitely many steps. Then the process converges to a
non-equilibrium state. As for real financial systems the least possible number of sold shares
in each round is lower bounded by 1, this can actually never happen and for all practical
purposes the final set of defaulted institutions is given by Dn , their caused systemic damage
by Sn := ∑i∈Dn si and the vector of finally sold shares is given by χn .
Furthermore, in the next section the following explicit lower bound on (Dn,χn) will be
necessary to draw an extensive picture of the contagion process.
Lemma 2.2 Let ◦ρi be the left-continuous modification of ρi for every i ∈ [n]. Then there
exists a smallest solution (D̂n, χ̂n) to
D =
{
i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D












Moreover, D̂n ⊆ Dn and χ̂n ≤ χn.
Finally, denote Ŝn = ∑i∈D̂n si . Then altogether, we derive the following statement.
Proposition 2.3 For the set of finally defaulted institutionsDn, their total systemic importance
Sn and the vector χn of finally sold shares divided by n it holds
D̂n ⊆ Dn ⊆ Dn, Ŝn ≤ Sn ≤ Sn, χ̂n ≤ χn ≤ χn .
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3 The stochastic model
In the previous section, we considered the combined contagion process of fire sales and
default contagion on any explicitly given financial system. In this section, we go one step
further and analyze a whole ensemble of systems simultaneously that share certain statistical
characteristics, i.e. we introduce a random model for the financial system that captures the
essential characteristics observed for real financial systems. This will ultimately help us to
understand which system structures promote global contagion or contain it locally.
In a first step we specify a random model for the inter-institutional exposures ei, j ; we
adopt the multi-type financial network model from [17]. We let the connection probability of
two institutions in the system depend on their respective types—larger within communities
or within cores, smaller between communities and for periphery institutions for instance.
Second, we allow for different exposure distributions between different institution types—
larger exposures between core-institutions for example.
From now on we assume that inter-institutional exposures ei, j are bounded and take
integer values in {0, . . . , R} for some R ∈ N. We refer to [31] for an extension to exposures
modelled by sequences of exchangeable (possibly unbounded) random variables in themulti-
type financial network model. We define a probability measure P on {0, . . . , R}|E |, where
E is the set of possible directed edges E := {(i, j) ∈ [n]2 : i = j}. To model random
exposures has several advantages:
1. The network of exposures can change significantly on amicroscopic level but as empirical
studies show, the global statistics are reasonably stable (see e.g. [14]).
2. Often only the aggregated exposures
∑
j∈[n] ei, j are available to the regulator. Since the
individual exposures are unknown it is thus advisable to use the information available
and consider probabilistic samples. Ideally one obtains results that hold for all possible
realizations.
3. A random network is analytically more tractable and provides more understanding of the
impact of the network characteristics on the combined fire sales and contagion process.
Our choice of P has to be such that the generated networks share the characteristics of
observed financial networks. We assume that the global financial system is composed of
institutions of T ∈ N different types in total. Instead of assuming deterministic exposures
{ei, j } j∈[n] ⊂ R+,0 as given Item 5. in Sect. 2.1 we now associate to each institution i ∈ [n]:
5′. (a) An institution-type αi ∈ [T ]: This parameter allocates institution i to a certain sub-
system such as country or core/periphery.
5′. (b) A vector of in-weights w−i ∈ R[R]×[T ]+,0 : The in-weight w−,r ,αi describes the tendency
of institution i to be exposed to an institution of type α with an exposure of size r .
5′. (c) A vector of out-weights w+i ∈ R[R]×[T ]+,0 : The out-weight w+,r ,αi describes the ten-
dency of institutions of type α to be exposed to i with an exposure of size r .
We assume in the following that institutions of the same type have the same sales function.
This still allows to distinguish between different types such as e.g. country, core/periphery,
banks/insurance companies/wealth managers, combinations of the aforementioned, or any
other reasonable segmentation and as noted before is important to account for different
regulatory environments. We denote by ρα the sales function of institutions of type α. The
occurrence of an edge of multiplicity r ∈ [R] (exposure size) going from i to j is then
modeled by a Bernoulli random variable Xri, j with success probability
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, if i = j,
0, if i = j,
(3.1)
where we assume mutual exclusiveness (
∑
r∈[R] Xri, j ≤ 1) respectively independence
Xr1i1, j1 ⊥ X
r2
i2, j2
for all r1, r2 and (i1, j1) = (i2, j2).
Now consider a collection of financial systems with varying size n. We want to ensure
that their statistical characteristics measured by means of the empirical distribution functions
stabilize as n → ∞. Moreover, wewant to prohibit that exposures or asset holdings condense
in one institution.
Assumption 3.1 (Regular vertex sequence) Let M ∈ N. For each n ∈ N consider a system
with n institutions and M assets specified by the sequences w−(n) = (w−i (n))i∈[n] of in-
weights, w+(n) = (w+i (n))i∈[n] of out-weights, x(n) = (xi (n))i∈[n] of asset holdings,
s(n) = (si (n))i∈[n] of systemic importance values, c(n) = (ci (n))i∈[n] of capitals, (n) =
(i (n))i∈[n] of exogenous losses and α(n) = (αi (n))i∈[n] of institution types. Then the
following shall hold:
(a) Convergence in distribution: For each n ∈ N let the random empirical distribution func-
tion of the system parameters be denoted by
Fn(w



















1{si ≤ s, ci ≤ c, i ≤ , αi ≤ α},
for w−,w+ ∈ R[R]×[T ]+,0 , x ∈ RM+,0, s ∈ R+,0, c ∈ R+,0,∞,  ∈ R+,0 and α ∈ [T ].
Let in the following (W−n ,W+n , Xn, Sn,Cn, Ln, An) denote a random vector distributed
according to Fn . Then there exists a distribution function F such that
Fn(w
−,w+, x, s, c, , α) → F(w−,w+, x, s, c, , α), as n → ∞,
at all continuity points of Fα(w−,w+, x, s, c, ) := F(w−,w+, x, s, c, , α).
(b) Convergence ofmeans:Denote by (W−,W+, X, S,C, L, A) a randomvector distributed
according to the limiting distribution F . Then as n → ∞,
E[W−,r ,αn ] → E[W−,r ,α] < ∞, E[W+,r ,αn ] → E[W+,r ,α] < ∞, for all r ∈ [R], α ∈ [T ],
E[Sn ] → E[S] < ∞ and E[Xmn ] → E[Xm ] < ∞, for all m ∈ [M].





















− zr ,α,β , (r , α, β) ∈ V ,
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W−,r ,γ zr ,β,γ , r ∈ [R], β ∈ [T ],
and for {qs}s∈[R] in R+,0 and independent Qs ∼ Poi(qs), s ∈ [R],













s∈[R] sQs + 
c
)]
, α ∈ [T ].
Let us give an intuitive explanation for the functions g, f r ,α,β and f m first. For this we
consider the special case R = T = 1 and start by looking at the fire sales and the default
contagion process separately.
We start with the default contagion process. Heuristically, for an externally given vector
of asset sales χ , the function f 1,1,1(·,χ) describes (in the limit n → ∞) the intensity of
the default contagion process over time. Here time refers to steps in a sequential analysis of
the process, which leads to the same set of defaulted institutions. Let now z̄ ∈ [0, E[W+]]
denote the total out-weight of finally defaulted banks divided by n. Then by the specification
of pi, j for any fixed bank i ∈ [n] the number of incoming edges (exposures) from finally
defaulted banks is given by a random variable Poi(w−,1,1i z̄). Institution i is hence finally
defaulted itself if and only if Poi(w−,1,1i z̄) ≥ ci − i − xi · h(χ). Summing over all banks








Poi(w−,1,1i z̄) ≥ ci − i − xi · h(χ)
}
≈ E[W+,1,1ψ(W−,1,1 z̄;C − L − X · h(χ))],







i + Poi(w−,1,1i z̄) + xi · h(χ) ≥ ci
} ≈ E[Sψ(W−,1,1 z̄,C − L − X · h(χ))] = g(z̄, χ).
Hence if fire sales are ignored, meaning the initial capital is simply reduced by a fixed amount
accounting for some externally given sales vector χ , then in order to get the final state of the
system we only need to determine the (first) root z̄ of f 1,1,1(·,χ) and plug it into g(·,χ).
Let us now look at the fire sales system with an externally given default contagion result.
For the case of one asset with label 1, fixing the sum of the out-weights of defaulted institu-
tions, divided by n to be z, then the loss institution i receives due to the liabilities to defaulted
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banks is described by the random quantity Poi(w−,1,1i z) and, for continuous ρ1, similarly as














−,1,1z; L + X1h(χ̄),C))
]
(3.2)
such that χ̄ is a root of f 1(z, ·). Moreover, the final systemic importance of defaulted insti-






Poi(w−,1,1i z)+i +x1i h1(χ̄) ≥ ci
} ≈ E[Sψ(W−,1,1z,C−L−X1h(χ̄))] = g(z, χ̄). (3.3)
So the root χ̄ of f 1(z, ·) determines the end of the process and again g yields the damage by
defaulted institutions.
These heuristics show that the joint fire sales and default contagion process should come
to an end at a joint root of the functions f r ,α,β , (r , α, β) ∈ V , and f m,m ∈ [M]. Under some
circumstances, however, if the distribution of (W−,W+, X, S,C, L, A) has atoms and one
or more of the functions ρα , α ∈ [T ], are discontinuous, also the functions f r ,α,β and f m
might be discontinuous. Similar as in the previous section, it is then in general not possible
to determine the precise end state of the system. Still we will be able to derive lower bounds
on the final default fraction and the vector of finally sold shares. To this end, define lower















































W−,r ,γ zr ,β,γ , r ∈ [R], β ∈ [T ],
and for {qs}s∈[R] in R+,0 and independent Qs ∼ Poi(qs), s ∈ [R],
◦
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, β ∈ [T ],
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for ◦ρβ(u) := limε→0+ ρβ((1 − ε)u). Further, let
◦






(z,χ) ∈ RV+,0 × RM+,0 :
◦





(z,χ) ∈ RV+,0 × RM+,0 :
◦












(z,χ) ∈ RV+,0 × RM+,0 : f m(z,χ) ≥ 0
}
that contain (0, 0) (note that f r ,α,β(0, 0) ≥ ◦f r ,α,β(0, 0) ≥ 0 for all (r , α, β) ∈ V as well as
f m(0) ≥ ◦f m(0) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ [M] and thus 0 ∈ ◦P and 0 ∈ P). We will later make use of
the fact that P and P0 are clearly closed sets. Finally, define z∗ ∈ RV+,0 and χ∗ ∈ RM+,0 by
(z∗)r ,α,β := sup(z,χ)∈P0 zr ,α,β and (χ∗)m := sup(z,χ)∈P0 χm . Then the following holds:
Lemma 3.2 There exists a smallest joint root ( ẑ, χ̂) of all the functions
◦
f r ,α,β , (r , α, β) ∈ V ,
and
◦
f m, m ∈ [M]. It holds ( ẑ, χ̂) ∈ ◦P0. Further, (z∗,χ∗) as defined above is a joint root of
the functions f r ,α,β , f m and (z∗,χ∗) ∈ P0.
The proof is analogue to the one of [18, Lemma EC. 1]. We can then describe the final
default fraction and the number of sold shares asymptotically as n → ∞ in terms of ( ẑ, χ̂)
and (z∗,χ∗).
Theorem 3.3 Consider a financial system that fulfills Assumption 3.1. Then for the final
systemic damage n−1Sn and χmn , the number of finally sold shares of asset m ∈ [M] divided
by n, it holds
◦
g( ẑ, χ̂) + op(1) ≤ n−1Sn ≤ g(z∗,χ∗) + op(1),
χ̂m + op(1) ≤ χmn ≤ (χ∗)m + op(1).
In particular, for the final price impact hm(χn) on asset m ∈ [M] it holds
hm(χ̂) + op(1) ≤ hm(χn) ≤ hm(χ∗) + op(1).
In most cases, ( ẑ, χ̂) and (z∗,χ∗) will coincide and ◦g( ẑ, χ̂) = g(z∗,χ∗). Theorem 3.3
then describes the limits in probability of χn and n
−1Sn for n → ∞. Note that the final
default fraction can be obtained from the theorem by choosing S ≡ 1.
4 Resilient and non-resilient systems
Our results from the previous section allow us to compute the final state of a system that was
initially hit by some exogenous shock starting a cascade of default contagion andfire sales.We
shall now go one step further and describe the vulnerability of an initially unshocked system
to small shocks. We achieve this goal by considering shocks L of different magnitude on
the same initially unshocked system described by (W−,W+, X, S,C, A). In the following,
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if we use the notations g,
◦
g, z∗ and χ∗ from Sect. 3 we mean the unshocked system with
L ≡ 0.
Our notion of resilience is related to the one for pure fire sales in [18] and this section
uses and extends ideas and methods from [18, Sect. 3].
4.1 Resilience
When it comes to regulation of a financial system, one desirable property is the capability
to absorb local shocks rather than amplify them through large parts of the system. In our
asymptotic model we can consider arbitrarily small shocks L and the following natural
notion of resilience emerges: when considering initial shocks L such that E[L/C] → 0, then
a system is called resilient if also the induced asymptotic final damage n−1Sn,L tends to 0.
Here and in the following we say that a sequence of events (En)n∈N holds with high
probability (w.h.p.) if P(En) → 1, as n → ∞.
Definition 4.1 (Resilience) A financial system (W−,W+, X, S,C, A) is said to be resilient,
if for each ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all L withE[L/C] < δ it holds n−1Sn,L ≤ ε
with high probability.
While this definition (and Corollary 4.3) is concernedwith the final systemic damage only,
the following theorem also investigates the number of sold shares of the assets (and hence
the price impacts which also affect the wider economy) in the limit E[L/C] → 0.
Theorem 4.2 For each ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all L with E[L/C] < δ the
final damage by defaulted institutions n−1Sn,L and the number nχmn,L of finally sold shares
of asset m ∈ [M] in the shocked system satisfy w.h.p.
n−1Sn,L ≤ g(z∗,χ∗) + ε and χmn,L ≤ (χ∗)m + ε, m ∈ [M].
In particular, we derive the following resilience criterion.
Corollary 4.3 (Resilience criterion) If g(z∗,χ∗) = 0, then the system is resilient.
It is thus sufficient for resilience if (z∗,χ∗) = (0, 0) or equivalently P0 = {(0, 0)}. If,
however, g(z∗,χ∗) = 0 while χ∗ = 0, then Corollary 4.3 still ensures that the final systemic
damage stays small and the system is resilient by Definition 4.1, while a large fraction of
shares of assets is sold due to fire sales as a reaction to small local shocks—see Theorem 4.6.
Remark 4.4 Let us compare our results with those obtained in combined default contagion
and fire-sales analysis in an Eisenberg–Noe setting as for example performed in [5,12,34]:
Although there are differences in the details of the contagion process and the exact specifica-
tion of fire-sales, our deterministic setup in Sect. 2 and our Proposition 2.3 shares similarity
with the setup of extended Eisenberg–Noe models and existence results of a greatest and
lowest clearing vector in that literature. However, the results in Sect. 3 depart from this set-
ting by analyzing the stochastic model and n → ∞ limits. Due to the asymptotic analysis
one gains (a) a description of the final default set and the number of sold assets as a fixpoint
equation of reduced dimension (Theorem 3.3) and (b) a classification of resilience (in partic-
ular Theorem 4.2) which is not possible in the deterministic setting. While, our setup ignores
possible intervention by regulators, the idea behind our Definition 4.1 of resilience is that the
financial system is stable enough such that in case a cascade starts, intervention is not nec-
essary because amplification effects are small. The results serve as a guideline for the design
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of regulatory requirements that ensure that the financial system has the desirable property
that intervention is not necessary in case of a shock. This is in contrast to the analysis in [5]
where the authors provide an analytical framework to measure the size of the amplification,
and thus the conditions under which the threat of a regulator of not intervening is credible.
4.2 Non-resilience
We now aim at characterizing non-resilient systems. For this note that our fire sales model
used here is in itself a conservative model as for each institution i ∈ [n] the entire asset
holdings xi are exposed to the price impact h(χn). It therefore ignores intermediate sales at
a more favorable asset price level. We refer to [18] for more discussion on and a treatment
of intermediate sales. The following results still give a first indication of non-resilience for
general financial systems.
We consider shocks of the form i ∈ {0, 2ci } such that P(L = 2C) > 0 and L/C is
independent of (W−,W+, X, S,C, A). It may seem odd at first to choose i = 2ci (or any
other multiple strictly larger than 1) instead of i = ci to express the default of institution i .
The reason is that in the proof of Theorem 4.6 below we want to use Theorem 3.3 which only
considers the limiting random vector (W−,W+, X, S,C, L, A). It would then be possible
that L = C in the limit n → ∞ while Ln < Cn almost surely for all n ∈ N. This situation
would not be distinguishable from Ln = Cn for all n ∈ N and in order to derive meaningful
results in Theorem 4.6 we have to choose i > ci . Since
◦
ρβ(u) = ρβ(u) = ρβ(1) for all
u > 1, β ∈ [T ], this does not affect the contagion process.
In contrast to Definition 4.1 of resilience, we call a financial system non-resilient if any
small shock causes a lower bounded linear damage by bankrupt institutions.
Definition 4.5 (Non-resilience) A financial system is said to be non-resilient if there exists
 > 0 such that n−1Sn,L >  w.h.p. for any L with the above listed properties.
The following theorem identifies lower bounds for the final default fraction and sold
shares.
Theorem 4.6 If the initial shock L satisfies above properties and hm(χ) is strictly increasing
in χm for all m ∈ [M], then for any ε > 0 w.h.p.
n−1Sn,L > ◦g(z∗,χ∗) − ε and χmn,L > (χ∗)m − ε.
The assumption on h(χ) is a rather mild one and is satisfied for all standard choices for
price impact functions such as linear price or log-linear price impact.
Corollary 4.7 (Non-resilience criterion) If hm(χ) is strictly increasing in χm for all m ∈ [M]
and
◦
g(z∗,χ∗) > 0, then the system is non-resilient.
For most practical purposes Corollaries 4.3 and 4.7 hence fully determine whether a
financial system is resilient or non-resilient.
5 Applications and simulations
In this section, we provide two applications of our theory. Example 5.1 has a twofold purpose:
it demonstrates the joint impact of default contagion and fire sales. The model parameters are
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chosen in such a way that the financial system would be resilient with respect to either one of
them but non-resilient with respect to their combination. Further, we provide simulations for
finite networks in this setting to confirm the applicability of our asymptotic results also for
reasonably sized financial systems. In Example 5.2, we derive sufficient capital requirements
for very general combined financial systems of default contagion and fire sales. This extends
results from [19] for pure default contagion and from [18] for purefire sales. Froma regulator’s
viewpoint, capital requirements are the main tool to manage the risk of financial institutions.
Traditionally, sufficient capital requirements are computed for each institution on a stand-
alone basis by applying some (univariate) monetary risk measure like for example Value-at-
Risk or Expected Shortfall. However, this approach fails to capture systemic effects, and a
recent line of research aims at rectifying this deficiency by determining system-wide capital
requirements based on various types of systemic (multivariate) monetary risk measures.
Historically, the first approach to systemic risk measures was to apply a univariate (mone-
tary) riskmeasure to some aggregated system-wide risk factor, see [11,26,29] for an axiomatic
characterization of this family of systemic risk measures. Capital requirements for individual
institutions must then be computed by some rule to allocate the total systemic risk capital. An
alternative approach is to determine the total systemic risk by computing sufficient capital
requirements on an institutional level before aggregating to a system-wide risk factor, see
[4,6,21]. In this context an important but difficult question is whether from an institutional
point of view the systemic capital requirements correspond to fair shares of the overall sys-
temic risk, see e.g. [6]. In particular, one of the major problems in the implementation of
the methodologies proposed in the literature mentioned above would be the fact that a given
individual systemic capital requirement in general depends on the configuration of the com-
plete system. As a consequence, one institution’s capital requirement might be manipulated
by other institutions’ behaviour, or the entrance of a new institution into the system would
potentially alter the capital requirements of all other institutions (even without direct business
relations), for example.
One important contribution of the asymptotic methodology proposed in this paper is that,
besides certain global parameters that need to be determined by a regulating institution, the
implied systemic capital requirement for a given institution i ∈ [n] only depends on its
asset holdings xi and its in-weights w
−,r ,α
i , which can be thought of as in-degrees, see [19].
They are thus very transparent and can be computed locally by the institutions themselves
as they only depend on the institutions’ own business decisions. This prevents institutions
from manipulating their own or others’ capital requirements and enables a fair allocation
of systemic risk in the financial network. For simplicity we assume S ≡ 1 throughout this
section and hence consider the final default fraction as the measure of systemic damage.
Example 5.1 Consider a financial system with R = T = M = 1. For simplicity we omit
superscripts throughout this example where appropriate. Letw−i = w+i = xi for each i ∈ [n]
and W− = W+ = X be Pareto distributed with density fX (x) = 2x−31{x ≥ 1}. Further, let
ci = 3.5 for each i ∈ [n] and in particular C = 3.5. Finally assume h(χ) = 1 − e−χ and
ρ(u) = 1{u ≥ 1}, that is banks sell assets at default only.
Since ci > 3, the systemwithout fire sales would then be resilient (see [19, Theorem 3.7]).
Also the pure fire sales system without loans would be resilient by [18, Corollary 1] since
for χ ≤ h−1(3.5)
f (χ) = E[X1{X ≥ 3.5/h(χ)}] − χ =
∫ ∞
3.5/h(χ)






1 − e−χ ) − χ
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Fig. 2 Plot of the root sets of the functions f 1,1,1(z, χ) (blue) and f 1(z, χ) (orange). Solid: the unshocked
functions. Dashed: the shocked functions. In grey the set P = P0. (Color figure online)
and hence f ′(0) = −3/7 < 0. However, for the combined contagion system we derive that
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)
1{χ ≤ log 2} − z,
f 1(z, χ) = f0(z, χ) + z − χ,
where Ei(x) := ∫ x−∞ t−1etdt denotes the exponential integral. In particular, f 1,1,1(z, z) =




























≈ 0.2462 > 0.
Hence the directional derivatives of f 1,1,1 and f 1 in direction (1, 1) are both positive and
thus z∗ > 0 and χ∗ > 0. See Fig. 2 for an illustration.
More precisely, we numerically determine (z∗, χ∗) ≈ (0.992, 0.992) and since g(z, χ) =
◦
g(z, χ) is given by


























− 7z2h(χ) + 4
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zh(χ)e





− z2h(χ) − e−z
)
1{χ ≤ log 2}
a lower bound on the final default fraction is asymptotically given by g(z∗, χ∗) ≈ 29.24%.
The combined system is thus non-resilient.
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Fig. 3 The simulation outcomes
for systems as described in
Example 5.1. In blue single
outcomes, in orange the mean
over all outcomes and in red the
theoretical asymptotic final
fraction. (Color figure online)






























If we let each bank in the system initially default with probability p = 1%, then we can
determine (ẑ p, χ̂p) = (z∗p, χ∗p) ≈ (1.028, 1.028) as the unique joint root of the functions◦
f 0(z, χ) = f 1,1,1p (z, χ) = (1 − p) f 1,1,1(z, χ) + p(2 − z) and
◦
f 1(z, χ) = f 1p (z, χ) =
(1 − p) f 1(z, χ) + p(2 − χ). Plugging it into ◦gp(z, χ) = gp(z, χ) = (1 − p)g(z, χ) + p
yields an asymptotic final fraction of 31.32%.
To verify this result for finite systems, we performed 105 simulations on systems of sizes
between 102 and 104 (1000 simulations for every multiple of 100) as well as 105 simulations
on systems of sizes between 103 and 105 (1000 simulations for everymultiple of 1000), where
we drew xi randomly according to the limiting distribution of X . Figure 3 shows the mean
over all 1000 simulations as an orange curve. Additionally, 100 simulations for every system
size are depicted by blue dots. The theoretical final fraction of 31.32% is drawn as a red line.
While for small n only few simulations ended in a final default fraction significantly larger
than p = 1% and those which did were considerably higher than the theoretical value of
31.32%, as n becomes larger, the average final fraction converges to 31.32% and the deviation
around this value becomes smaller and smaller. Already for n ≈ 4, 000 the simulated and
the theoretical results are considerably close.
Example 5.2 (Capital requirements) In the previous example we considered the case that
ρ(u) = 1{u ≥ 1}, i.e. sales at default only. Intermediate sales will make the system less
resilient, and we shall consider such an example now. We choose ρ(u) = 1 ∧ uq for some
q > 0. We consider one asset only and the parameter q could be understood as a measure for
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the banks’ confidence in the asset. Further, assume that the price impact is h(χ) = (χν) for
small χ and ν ≥ q−1, i.e. there exist constants μ1, μ2 ∈ (0,∞) such that μ1χν ≤ h(χ) ≤
μ2χ
ν for χ ≤ χ0 small enough. The generalization to multiple assets is straight forward in
analogy to [18, Corollary 5].
The distribution of asset holdings is assumed to have a power law tail in the sense that
1− FX (x) = (x1−β) for some β ∈ (2,∞), i.e. there exist constants B1, B2 ∈ (0,∞) such
that B1x1−β ≤ 1 − FX (x) ≤ B2x1−β for x ≥ x0 large enough.
First assume that R = T = 1. Recall then from [19, Theorem 3.11] the sufficient (and
necessary) capital requirements for a pure default contagionmodel without fire sales: Assume
1−FW±(w) ≤ (w/K±)1−β± for constants K± ∈ (0,∞) andβ± > 2, and forw ≥ w0 ∈ R+.
That is, the tails of the distributions of W− and W+ are at most of power β− resp. β+. If
we let γc := 2 + β−−1β+−1 − β− and ci = c(w−i ) for each bank i ∈ [n] with c : R+,0 →
(1,∞), then the (pure default contagion) system is resilient if either γc < 0, γc > 0 and
lim infw→∞ w−γc c(w) > β
+−1
β+−2K
+(K−)1−γc =: αc or γc = 0 and lim infw→∞ c(w) >
αc + 1. It thus makes sense to define capital requirements cdir(w) = max{2, αwγ } for some
constants α > αc and γ ≥ γc.
Adding the capital requirements cdir against direct contagion to the sufficient capital
requirements cind(x) = θx against fire sales (indirect contagion) found in [18, Corollary 4],
we thus get the combined capital requirement ci ≥ c(w−i , xi ) for each i ∈ [n], where
c(w, x) = max{2, αwγ } + θx .
In fact, we can show that these capital requirements make the combined system resilient: It
holds









− χ < 0
for χ > 0 small enough since C ≥ θX . Since f 1(z, χ) is continuous in z for fixed χ , we
can then choose z > 0 small enough such that still f 1(z, χ) < 0. Furthermore, it holds for
χ < h−1(θ) and z > 0 small enough that
f 1,1,1(z, χ) ≤ E [W+P (Poi(W−z) ≥ max {2, α(W−)γ })] − z < 0
by resilience of the pure default contagion system (see the proof of [19, Theorem 3.11]). By
definition of (z∗, χ∗) we can then conclude z∗ < z and χ∗ < χ . However, z and χ can be
chosen arbitrarily small and thus z∗ = χ∗ = 0. The combined system is then resilient by
Corollary 4.3.
6 Model estimation procedure
Our model describes how distress propagates through financial systems by default contagion
and fire sales. The previous section shows that our analytic results, although derived asymp-
totically for large systems, approximate cascades in finite systems well. When using our
model to analyze the stability of some observed real financial network, however, it is clearly
necessary to calibrate the used model parameters to observed quantities. For this reason, we
shall discuss how such a calibration can be achieved.
We start with the type assignment. One of the core assumptions of our model is the
classification of institutions into certain blocks by their type. While this assignment can be
obvious with regard to certain institution characteristics such as its business model (retail
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bank, hedge fund, insurance company, etc.) or its geographical location, other traits can be
more challenging to detect and require amore sophisticated calibration. In particular, we need
to group institutions into communities and identify core-periphery structures to describe real
financial networks in a proper way. The literature on such detection algorithms, however, is
well developed. See for example [7,13,15,22,36,37], respectively [27,33].
Having assigned a certain institution type to all members of the financial system, the
next challenge is the choice of vertex weight parameters for each of them. In the following,
we propose an estimation of weights based on likelihood maximization. For this purpose,
we assume that for each institution the distribution of its exposures r = 1 . . . R towards
institutions of a given type is known. Note that the (distribution of) exposures might not be
directly observable and possibly need to be estimated.
In our model for any two types α, β ∈ [T ] and r ∈ [R] a subsystem of links is induced
(all links of exposure size r going from an α-institution to a β-institution) and the calibration
of {w+,r ,βi , w−,r ,αj }i, j∈[n]:αi=α,α j=β is independent from all other subsystems. To simplify
the discussion in the following, we thus consider a one-type (T = 1) system with constant
exposure of 1 (R = 1) and abbreviate w±,1,1i by w±i . By the same methods any other
subsystem can be calibrated to observed data.
First note that for a network G of size n with edge set E(G) the likelihood of weight
sequences w− = (w−1 , . . . , w−n ) and w+ = (w+1 , . . . , w+n ) is given by
L(w−1 , w
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One can always derive the maximum-likelihood estimators ŵ−1 , . . . , ŵ−n , ŵ
+
1 , . . . , ŵ
+
n by
numerically maximizing L . In order to obtain some intuition about them, we further want
to derive an approximation of the estimators. For this, we assume that w+i w
−
j  n for all
i, j ∈ [n] which is a reasonable assumption at least when W+, W− are square-integrable.
We can hence approximate
L(w−1 , w
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i are the in and out degree of institution
i , respectively. By the product form w+i w
−
j in (3.1), we are free to multiply all out-weights
w+i by some constant η if, at the same time, we multiply all in-weights by its inverse η−1.















i and want to maximize the approximated likelihood function under
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Differentiating with respect to w−l resp. w
+





























































l must be independent of l and we can thus find con-















i , we obtain that λ = 0 and























That is, the approximated weight estimators are proportional to the observed degrees and
only normalized in a certain sense.






k , the better is above
approximation ofw+i w
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k  n. On networkswheremaxi, j∈[n] d+i d−j /∑
k∈[n] d
−
k is large, w
− and w+ have to be estimated numerically. After each institution has
been assigned a type αi according to one of the above cited methods and their weights w
−
i
and w+i have been estimated, it remains to fit a multivariate distribution to the empirical
distribution of {(w−i ,w+i , ci , αi )}i∈[n] in order to completely determine the distribution of
(W−,W+,C, A).
7 Discussion
In this paper we propose an asymptotic model to analyze contagion in financial networks.
It combines two important channels of contagion: default contagion and fire sales. It can
be specified by the joint distribution of capital, asset holdings, network liabilities and other
relevant quantities. There is no restriction on the joint distribution of the parameters except
that we require existence of a first moment. This makes the model rather general and, thanks
to its asymptotic nature, allows the parameters of the model to be chosen from all kinds of
distribution as Pareto, Exponential, Gamma or Fréchet to name just a few. The sales functions
ρα, α ∈ [T ] allow to specify (and test accordingly) different regulatory environments. For
example in a crisis, a regulator could use the model as a decision guidance to decide whether
to suspend the enforcement of certain leverage requirements in order to stop a contagion spiral
driven by asset sales, aimed to fulfil them. See [12] for a discussion of events that triggered
such regulatory actions in the past. Moreover, the model serves as a decision tool for the
search of the most favourable financial systems and regulatory environments. The results
provided in Theorems 3.3, 4.2 and 4.6 allow to test different stress scenarios easily without
complicated and computationally heavy simulation of the entire contagion process. Only the
functionals g, f m and f r ,α,β have to be calculated, which (if an analytic expression is not
available for the chosen parameters) can always be done via simple Monte Carlo simulation.
As we have seen in Examples 5.1 and 5.2, in some situations conclusions about resilience
can even be derived without any simulation, on a purely analytic level.
Despite the generality of the model, results have to be taken with some caution. While
it is a first step towards an integrated model within the asymptotic framework, it is not a
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fully fledged systemic risk analysis aiming to provide precise numerical predictions about
the contagion outcome triggered by certain stress scenarios. Still, we believe that it serves as
valuable tool for comparison of different regulatory measures and for identifying preferable
structures of financial systems. Some of the most crucial simplifications of our model are:
• Conservative: Themodel is conservative in several regards: The recovery rate of defaulted
institutions is assumed to be zero. This can be considered a reasonable assumption in
the short term, considering that the resolution of defaulted institutions takes time. For
example, the resolution of Lehman Brothers took over 10 years, and in a bond auction for
the settlement of credit default swaps written on Lehman Brothers just three weeks after
its default the realized recovery rate only amounted to 8.625% [30].We remark, however,
that all results in our model can be derived analogously for any other exogenously given
(but possibly institution-dependent) recovery rate. Similarly, the fire-sales process is
conservative as xi · h(χ) serves only as an upper bound to the loss experienced by
institution i after χ shares have been sold.
• Asset purchase The model does not feature buyers who might jump in to profit from
buying assets that have devalued due to the fire-sale spiral. These buyers are most likely
part of the non-banking sector and serve as crucial liquidity providers as shown in [10].
While our block model allows to include these institutions even if they do not participate
in the interbank lendingmarket and are not selling assets, their positive effect as a liquidity
provider can only be incorporated via the specification of the function h. Modelling asset
purchases in an endogenous way, however, is not possible within our current model.
• Missing channels The model ignores other important channels of contagion as for exam-
ple cross-holdings, liquidity contagion or bank runs.
• Static: While the model considers different rounds of contagion, it is static in the sense
thatmodel parameters are not changing over time. Due to the asymptotic nature variations
on a local level are not likely to change the outcome as long as global characteristics are
not changing. However, in a crisis, the entire system might change and adapt to the new
environment.
• Systemically important financial institutionsAssumption 3.1 of a regular vertex sequence
ensures that as n → ∞ the number of vertices with certain parameters stabilizes. This
together with the first moment assumption in 3.1 and the specification of link probabili-
ties (3.1) has the consequence that the influence of a finite set of institutions vanishes as
n → ∞. This might seem at odds with the idea that a small set of banks is systemically
important and might have to be regulated differently. In our framework however, it is
more natural to think of a small fraction of banks (of size εn) to be systemically impor-
tant. Within our block model framework one could then assign to them their own block
αSIFI and ensure that (W−,W+) is specified such that Systemically Important Financial
Institutions build significantly more links than other institutions.
Some of the simplifications mentioned give rise to future investigations. Also, this paper
focuses on the theoretical foundations, accompanied by a simulation study to show the accu-
racy of the asymptotic results for finite networks. While we study the implications of our
model for few stylized examples, it is beyond the scope of the current paper and left for
future research to apply this model to the many different possible settings. In particular the
relatively advanced block model setup for the liability network allows to analyze many inter-
esting shock distributions. To name just a few examples, one could analyze shock distributions
targeting institutions of certain size only, institutions under certain regulatory requirements,
institutionswith large asset holdings or only institutions participating in the interbankmarket.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proofs for Sect. 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1 Existence of a smallest solution (Dn,χn) follows from the Knaster-
Tarski theorem.
Clearly, ∅ = D(0) ⊆ Dn and 0 = σ (0) ≤ χn . So let us inductively assume thatD(k) ⊆ Dn
and n−1σ (k) ≤ χn for some 0 < k ∈ N. Then
D(k+1) =
{
i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D(k)




i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈Dn



























In particular, this shows thatDn = ⋃k∈N D(k) ⊆ Dn and χn = n−1 limk→∞ σ (k) ≤ χn .
Proof of Lemma 2.2 Existence of a smallest solution (D̂n, χ̂n) follows from the Knaster-
Tarski theorem. Consider now the adjusted contagion process D̃(0) = D(0) = ∅, σ̃ (0) =
σ (0) = 0 and
D̃(k) =
{
i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D̃(k−1)

























D(k) = Dn and χ̃n := n−1 lim
k→∞ σ̃ (k) ≤ n
−1 lim
k→∞ σ (k) = χn .
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We will now show that (D̃n, χ̃n) is a solution to (2.5) and (2.6) such that in particular
D̂n ⊆ D̃nDn and χ̂n ≤ χ̃n ≤ χn . Clearly,
D̃(k) =
{
i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D̃(k−1)




i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D̃n








i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D̃n
e j,i > ci − i − xi · h(χ̃n)
}
.
On the other hand, if for i ∈ [n] it holds
∑
j∈D̃n
e j,i > ci − i − xi · h(χ̃n),
then by continuity of h we find k ∈ N large enough such that
∑
j∈D̃n
e j,i > ci − i − xi · h(n−1σ̃ (k)).
Without loss of generality assume that k is large enough such that D̃(k) = D̃n . Then in
particular i ∈ D̃(k) = D̃n and
D̃n =
{
i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈D̃n
e j,i > ci − i − xi · h(χ̃n)
}
.
That is, D̃n and χ̃n solve (2.5). Moreover, they solve (2.6) as
χ̃n = n−1 lim















j∈D̃n e j,i + i + xi · h(χ̃n)
ci
)
where we used left continuity of h, ◦ρi , i ∈ [n], and the fact that D̃(k) = D̃n for k large
enough.
8.2 Proofs for Sect. 3
We first consider the special case, summarized in the following definition, where the weights,
asset holdings, systemic importance levels, capitals and exogenous losses take only finitely
many different values.
Definition 8.1 (Finitary regular vertex sequence) A regular vertex sequence (see Assump-
tion 3.1) denoted by (w−(n),w+(n), x(n), s(n), c(n), (n),α(n))n∈N is called finitary if
there exist J ∈ N and a finite set {(w̃−j , w̃+j , x̃ j , s̃ j , c̃ j , ̃ j )} j∈[J ] ⊂ R[R]×[T ]+,0 × R[R]×[T ]+,0 ×
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R
M+,0×R+,0×R+,∞×R+,0 such that for all n ∈ N and i ∈ [n], there exists j = j(n, i) ∈ [J ]
such that (w−i ,w
+
i , xi , si , ci , i ) = (w̃−j , w̃+j , x̃ j , s̃ j , c̃ j , ̃ j ). Denote in the following
pβj (n) := P(W−n = w̃−j ,W+n = w̃+j , Xn = x̃ j , Sn = s̃ j ,Cn = c̃ j , Ln = ̃ j , An = β)
and
pβj = limn→∞ p
β
j (n) = P(W− = w̃−j ,W+ = w̃+j , X = x̃ j , S = s̃ j ,C = c̃ j , L = ̃ j , A = β).
We can then prove a version of Theorem 3.3 for the finitary case:
Theorem 8.2 Consider a financial system described by a finitary regular vertex sequence.
Then for the final systemic damage n−1Sn and χmn , the number of finally sold shares of asset
m ∈ [M] divided by n, it holds
◦
g( ẑ, χ̂) + op(1) ≤ n−1Sn ≤ g(z∗,χ∗) + op(1),
χ̂m + op(1) ≤ χmn ≤ (χ∗)m + op(1).
In particular, for the final price impact hm(χn) on asset m ∈ [M] it holds
hm(χ̂) + op(1) ≤ hm(χn) ≤ hm(χ∗) + op(1).
The difficulty for this problem lies in the fact that the functions f r ,α,β are discontinuous
in χ . That is, there exist values for χ (sold assets) at which a linear fraction of banks defaults.
However, f r ,α,β is discontinuous at (z,χ) only if (c̃ j − ̃ j − x̃ j · h(χ)) ∈ N for some j ∈ J
and there are hence only finitely many (possibly degenerated) hyperplanes of discontinuities.
Proof. We start with the proof of the lower bounds. That is, for arbitrary ε > 0 we will show
that n−1Sn ≥ n−1Ŝn ≥ (1 − ε) ◦g( ẑ, χ̂) and χmn ≥ χ̂mn ≥ (1 − ε)χ̂m w.h.p. We therefore
consider the contagion process given by rounds (i′) and (ii′). That is, we first consider a
cascade of default contagion. Once this cascade has ended (after at most n−1 steps) we start
a cascade of fire sales and so on.
In order to quantify the default contagion cascade we use [31, Theorem 3.2.4], which
extends the setting in [17] for systemic importance. That is, if we denote by ẑ1 ∈ RV+,0 the















⎠ > C − L
⎞
⎠ 1{A = β}
⎤
⎦ = ẑr ,α,β1


















⎠ > C − L
⎞
⎠ 1{A = β}
⎤
⎦
from below w.h.p. for any fixed δ > 0. In fact, by finitariness of the system we can find θ > 0















⎠ > C − L
⎞

















⎠ ≥ C − L + θ
⎞
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(note that C − L + θ is the weak limit of Cn − Ln + θ again by finitariness) and we
are thus in the setting of [17]. However, while [31, Theorem 3.2.4] focuses on the systemic
damage due to defaulted banks only, here it is also important to keep track of all losses due to
defaults. In fact, the proof of [31, Theorem 3.2.4] for finitary systems shows that the number
qβj,k of institutions of class j and type β with a total edge weight from finally defaulted
neighbors of at least k ≤ c̃ j is lower bounded by



















w.h.p. for δ > 0. Since in this part of the proof we are interested in lower bounds, we assume
in the following that qβ










1 ) ≥ c̃ j −








1 ) = k) for 1 ≤ k < c̃ j − ̃ j,
and qβj,0 = npβj (n) −
∑c̃ j−̃ j 
k=1 q
β
j,k w.h.p. That is, we increase the losses due to default
contagion.
Next, we want to use [18, Theorem EC. 1] to quantify the impact of the round of fire sales.
We need to consider losses (and defaults in particular) due to the previous default contagion
cascade. That is, we need to add to the exogenous losses i the edge weight from defaulted
debtors of each bank i ∈ [n]. This leads to a new loss vector (′i
)
i∈[n]. Note that we can set
′i = ̃ j +c̃ j − ̃ j if i is of type j and the total edge-weight k from finally defaulted debtors
of i is larger or equal to c̃ j − ̃ j. Denoting by L ′n a random vector distributed according to




i∈[n], we thus derive that w.h.p.
P
(


















c̃ j − ̃ j
⌉)
, if k =
⌈
c̃ j − ̃ j
⌉
,












, if 1 ≤ k ≤
⌈
c̃ j − ̃ j
⌉
− 1,












, if k = 0.
For simplicity in the notation, we assume that from (x̃ j , s̃ j , c̃ j , ̃ j ) = (x̃k, s̃k, c̃k, ̃k) it
follows j = k (i.e. classes j and k are not distinguished by their in- and out-weights only) in
the following. Otherwise consider sums over classes with the same asset holdings, systemic
importance, capital and exogenous loss.
In particular, for the weak limit (X, S,C, L ′, A) of (Xn, Sn,Cn, L ′n, An) and 0 ≤ k ≤
c̃ j − ̃ j
P
(
X = x̃ j , S = s̃ j ,C = c̃ j , L ′ = ̃ j + k, A = β
)































− χm, m ∈ [M]
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the corresponding functions as in [18] adapted to the setting with heterogeneous sales func-
tions and χ̂ δ its smallest fixed point. Then
◦












̃ j + k + x̃ j · h(χ)
c̃ j
)
P(X = x̃ j , S = s̃ j ,C = c̃ j , L ′ = ̃ j + k, A = β)




























= (1 − δ)( ◦f m( ẑ1,χ) + χm)
and
◦
f mδ (χ) ≥ (1 − δ)
◦
f m( ẑ1,χ) − δχm ≥
◦
f m( ẑ1,χ) − δE[Xm]. In particular,
lim infδ→0+
◦
f mδ (χ) ≥
◦
f m( ẑ1,χ) andby [18,LemmaEC.2]wederive that lim infδ→0+ χ̂ δ ≥
χ̂1, where χ̂1 denotes the smallest joint root of the functions
◦
f m( ẑ1,χ),m ∈ [M]0, for fixed
z = ẑ1.
We can hence choose δ small enough such that the number of finally sold shares of asset





















X = x̃ j , S = s̃ j ,C = c̃ j , L ′ = ̃ j + k, A = β
)



























= (1 − δ) ◦g( ẑ1,χ)
and possibly further reducing δ, we derive n−1Ŝn ≥
√
1 − ε ◦gδ(χ̂ δ) ≥ (1 − ε) ◦g( ẑ1, χ̂1)
w.h.p. So if ( ẑ1, χ̂1) = ( ẑ, χ̂), then this finishes the proof of the lower bounds.
If ( ẑ1, χ̂1) = ( ẑ, χ̂), then by construction of ( ẑ, χ̂), ẑ1 and χ̂1 it must hold that χ̂1 ≤ χ̂















⎠ > C − L − X · h(χ̂1)
⎞
⎠ 1{A = β}
⎤
⎦ = ẑr ,α,β2 .
The next step in the cascade process would now be the default contagion cascade from (i′)
starting from the state of the system after the fire sales cascade. Note, however, that (w.h.p.)
we can equivalently restart the whole cascade process if for the default contagion cascade
we choose capitals ci − i − xi · h((1 − ε)χ̂1). If anything this reduces contagion effects
which is alright because we are interested in lower bounds.
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⎠ > C − L − X · h((1 − ε)χ̂1)
⎞
⎠ 1{A = β}
⎤
⎦
= ẑr ,α,β2 .
and we can hence use [31, Theorem 3.2.4] to quantify the default cascade. By exactly the
samemeans as above we can then translate the losses due to default contagion into exogenous
losses and investigate the fire sales process by [18, Theorem EC. 1]. We derive that the vector
of finally sold shares is lower bounded by n(1− ε)χ̂2 w.h.p., where χ̂2 denotes the smallest
joint root of the functions
◦
f m( ẑ2,χ) for z = ẑ2, and n−1Ŝn ≥ (1 − ε) ◦g( ẑ2, χ̂2) w.h.p.
Again, if ( ẑ2, χ̂2) = ( ẑ, χ̂), then this finishes the proof of the lower bounds. Otherwise
we can continue on for t ≥ 3. Note, however, that ẑ  ẑt is only possible if χ̂ t−1 and χ̂ t
are separated by a hyperplane of discontinuity of f r ,α,β for some (r , α, β) ∈ V (and hence
the fire sales lead to further defaults in the system). However, as remarked earlier, there can
only be finitely many such hyperplanes for finitary systems. Hence by the procedure outlined
above, we will reach ẑ in finitely many steps and hence the end results still hold w.h.p.
We can now turn to the second part of the proof. We consider the contagion process
in rounds (i) and (ii) to derive upper bounds on Sn and χn . Let ( z̃(δ), χ̃(δ))δ>0 be the
constructing sequence of (z∗,χ∗) analogue to [18, Remark EC. 1]. Then note that by
upper semi-continuity and the discrete nature of f r ,α,β we can find  > 0 such that
f r ,α,β(z, χ̃(δ)) = f r ,α,β(z,χ∗) for all 0 ≤ δ < , (r , α, β) ∈ V and z ∈ RV+,0.
Fix now some δ ∈ (0,) and consider the financial system with reduced capital values
ci − i − xi · h(χ̃(δ)) for each bank i ∈ [n]. We only want to consider the default contagion
process in this new financial system and we are hence in the setting of [16] with limiting
random variables (W−,W+, S, C − L − X · h(χ̃(δ))+, A). Note that by finitariness the
regularity transfers. By the choice of δ above, we derive that for z∗δ in this new financial
system, it holds z∗δ = z∗ and by [31, Theorem 3.2.4] we know that the final systemic damage


















⎠ ≥ C − L − X · h(χ̃(δ))
⎞




The proof of [31, Theorem 3.2.4] actually shows that the number of banks of type β and
class j with at least an edge-weight of k from defaulted neighbors at the end of the default
contagion process is upper bounded by


















w.h.p. for any fixed ε > 0. Similarly, as in the first part of this proof (for the lower bounds)
we can then construct a fire sales system with limiting random vector (X, S,C, L ′) such that
P(X = x̃ j , S = s̃ j ,C = c̃ j , L ′ = ̃ j + k, A = β)
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0 ≤ k <
⌈





X = x̃ j , S = s̃ j ,C = c̃ j , L ′ = ̃ j +
⌈
c̃ j − ̃ j − x̃ j · h(χ̃(δ))
⌉
















































which dominates the stochastic final state after the default contagion cascade w.h.p.
Let now













the corresponding functions for the fire sales system as in [18] adapted to the setting with
heterogeneous sales functions and χ∗ε the corresponding value for χ∗ in [18]. Then for
f m(z,χ) as in Sect. 3,












̃ j + k + x̃ j · h(χ)
c̃ j
)


































= (1 + ε)( f m(z∗,χ) + χm).
In particular, we can choose ε > 0 small enough such that
f mε (χ̃(δ/2)) ≤ f m(z∗, χ̃(δ/2)) + ε
(
f m(z∗, χ̃(δ/2)) + χ̃m(δ/2)) ≤ −δ/2 + εE[Xm] < 0,
where in the last inequality it was used that f m(z∗, χ̃(δ/2)) ≤ f m( z̃(δ/2), χ̃(δ/2)) = −δ/2.
We can hence conclude that χ∗ε ≤ χ̃(δ/2) componentwise. By (a slightly tedious but simple
generalization to type dependent sales functions of) [18, Theorem EC. 1] we thus derive that
the number of finally sold shares of asset m in the fire sales system (X, S,C, L ′) is upper
bounded by n((χ∗ε )m + o(1)) ≤ n(χ̃m(δ/2) + o(1)) ≤ nχ̃m(δ), where the last inequality
holds for n large enough since χ̃m(δ) > 0.
The idea for the rest of this proof is now to apply this upper bound on the number of
finally sold shares inductively in each step of the following adjusted contagion process: Let




⎩i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈Dk
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Clearly, this process stabilizes after at most n steps at (Dn,χn), the smallest solution to
(2.3) and (2.4) and by Lemma 2.1 gives thus an upper bound to the actual contagion process
described by (2.1) and (2.2), which is sufficient for our considerations here.
In particular, since χ0 = 0 ≤ χ̃(δ), we derive that D1 ⊆ Dδ , where Dδ ⊆ [n] is the




⎩i ∈ [n] :
∑
j∈Dδ




and hence χ1 ≤ χ δ , where χ δ denotes the smallest vector such that









However, (8.4) is exactly the cascade of default contagion with initial capitals given by
ci − i − xi · h(χ̃(δ)), i ∈ [n], which we considered before and (8.5) the subsequent
cascade of fire sales for which we showed that the vector of finally sold shares is upper
bounded by nχ̃(δ) w.h.p. (i.e. χ δ ≤ χ̃(δ)). We can then consider the second iteration and
derive that w.h.p. D2 ⊆ Dδ and χ2 ≤ χ δ . Inductively this shows that w.h.p. Dk ⊆ Dδ and
χk ≤ χ δ≤ χ̃(δ) w.h.p. for each fixed k ∈ N (independent of n).
Now note that because of the finitariness of the system, the contagion process actually
stabilizes already after a bounded number of iterations K ∈ N (independent of n). We have
thus shown that also for the final vector of sold shares χn it holds χn ≤ χn = χK ≤χ̃(δ)
w.h.p. Letting δ → 0 this proves the upper bound on χn .
For the final systemic damage note that w.h.p. Dn ⊆ Dδ and hence
























= g(z∗, χ̃(δ)) + op(1)
by (8.3). Using upper semi-continuity of g and letting δ → 0 this finishes the proof.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
In this section,we showhow the validity of Theorem8.2 can be extended to the case of general
(non-finitary) regular vertex sequences. The idea is the following: We will approximate the
given regular vertex sequence from below and from above by finitary vertex sequences and
couple the contagion processes in those systems such that the final default fraction and the
number of sold shares is under- or overestimated by the finitary systems.
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Wewill describe the finitary systems by their distribution functions {F Ak }k∈N and {FBk }k∈N
respectively in the following and we need to ensure that the functions g and f m , m ∈ [M],
are approximated close enough. To this end, consider the integrands









w−,1,γ z1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
w−,R,γ zR,β,γ ; c − l − x · h(χ)
⎞
⎠ 1{τ = β},






w−,1,γ z1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
w−,R,γ zR,β,γ ; c − l − x · h(χ)
⎞
⎠
1{τ = β}, (r , α, β) ∈ V ,









w−,1,γ z1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
w−,R,γ zR,β,γ ; l + x · h(χ), c
⎞
⎠
1{τ = β}, m ∈ [M],
for (z,χ ,w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ ) ∈ RV+,0 × RM+,0 × D∞, with w± = (w±,r ,α)r∈[R],α∈[T ] as










hg(z, χ;w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF(w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ ),
f r ,α,β (z, χ) =
∫
D∞
hr ,α,βf (z, χ;w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF(w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ ) − zr ,α,β , (r , α, β) ∈ V ,
f m(z, χ) =
∫
D∞
hmf (z, χ;w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF(w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ ) − χm , m ∈ [M],
where F denotes the distribution function of (W−,W+, X, S,C, L, A) (note that the inte-
grands vanish for c = ∞ and it is thus sufficient to integrate over D∞). We denote in the
following
H := {hg} ∪
⋃
(r ,α,β)∈V




and Z := [0, ζ ] × [0, η] ⊂ RV+,0 × RM+,0, for ζ r ,α,β = E[W+,r ,α1{A = β}], (r , α, β) ∈ V ,
and ηm = E[Xm], m ∈ [M]. If we further let
◦










w−,1,γ z1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
w−,R,γ zR,β,γ ; c − l − x · h(χ)
⎞
⎠ 1{τ = β},
◦
hr , α, β f (z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )





w−,1,γ z1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
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1{τ = β}, (r , α, β) ∈ V ,
◦










w−,1,γ z1,β,γ , . . . ,
∑
γ∈[T ]
w−,R,γ zR,β,γ ; l + x · h(χ), c
⎞
⎠











hg(z, χ;w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF(w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ ),
◦




hr , α, β f (z,χ; w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )
− zr ,α,β , (r , α, β) ∈ V ,
◦




hmf (z, χ; w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF(w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ ) − χm , m ∈ [M].
Also denote
◦
H := { ◦hg} ∪ ⋃(r ,α,β)∈V {
◦
hr , α, β f } ∪ ⋃m∈[M]0{
◦
hmf }.
For j ∈ N, consider now discretizations
F̃ Aj (w
















































j∈N converge to F . Choose now k ∈ N, h ∈ H and let
for 0 ≤ s ≤ 2k2 the sets
Is(z,χ) :=
{
(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ ) : h(z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ ) ≥ s
2k
}
which are closed by upper semi-continuity of h. Further, let






(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ ) ∈ Is(z,χ)
}
such that in particular h − (2k)−1 ≤ ĥ ≤ h ≤ k on RV+,0 × RM+,0 × Dk with
Dk :=
{
(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ ) : w− ≤ k1,w+ ≤ k1, x ≤ k1, s ≤ k, c ≤ k,  ≤ k} .











h(z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF̃ A,Bj −
∫
Dk
h(z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF ≤ k−1
(8.6)
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Dk := {(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ ) : w− < k1,w+ < k1, x < k1, s < k, c < k,  < k}.
We denote F
A
k := F̃ Ajk and F
B
k := F̃ Bjk in the following.
Note that F
A,B
k already describe discrete distributions approximating F from below and
from above. To qualify as a distribution function of a finitary vertex sequence, however, only
finitely many atoms are allowed. For the lower bound, we thus choose
F Ak (w





− ∧ k, w+ ∧ k, x ∧ k, s ∧ k, c ∧ k,  ∧ k, τ ), if c < ∞,
1, else,
thus setting capital to ∞ for banks with in-weight, out-weight, asset holdings, capital or
exogenous losses larger than k. We call such banks large in the following. Banks with infinite
capital keep their capital. As banks with infinite capital cannot ever default or sell any asset
shares anyway we set their weights, asset holdings and losses all to zero. In particular, above
choice reduces contagion in the system even further and thus for all k ∈ N the final systemic
damage n−1(S Ak )n is stochastically dominated by n−1Sn . The same holds for the number of
finally sold shares of the assets.
We now want to construct the upper bound distribution function FBk . That is, we need to
accumulate the contagious potential of all large banks to finitely many point masses. Thus






1{τ = β}dF(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ ),









w+,r ,α1{τ = β}dF(w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ ) ≥ 2k, if γ βk > 0,
2k, if γ βk = 0,







xm1{τ = β}dF(w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ ) ≥ 2k, if γ βk > 0,







s1{τ = β}dF(w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ ) ≥ 2k, if γ βk > 0,
2k, if γ βk = 0.
Similar as for the lower bound before, we now let FBk be given by F
B
k on Dk . Moreover, let
FBk assign the remaining masses γ
β






k , 0, 0, β). As we have left
out institutions with infinite capital thus far, finally let FBk assign masses P(C = ∞, A = β)
to the point (0, 0, 0, 0,∞, 0, β) for each β ∈ [T ].
The construction above ensures that small banks are more contagious than in the original
system as their weights, asset holdings and losses are increased whereas their capitals are
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decreased. Moreover, all large banks are initially defaulted and their total number of shares







k + o(1)) = 2n
∫
Dck
xmdF(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )(1 + o(1))




xmdF(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )(1 + o(1)).











w+,r ,α1{τ = β}dF(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )(1 + o(1))




w+,r ,α1{τ = β}dF(w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )(1 + o(1)).
Similar as in [16] for each r ∈ [R] the number of r -edges from large banks to a specific
small bank in the approximating system thus stochastically dominates their analogue in the
original system and in particular this property transfers to the total direct exposure from large
banks by summing over all r ∈ [R]. Altogether we derive the following result.
Lemma 8.3 Consider a regular vertex sequence and let sequences {F Ak }k∈N and {FBk }k∈N






n be the total systemic importance of












where  denotes stochastic domination. If further (χ A,Bk )mn denotes the number of finally





























hmf (z, χ; w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF A,Bk (w−, w+, x, s, c, , τ ) − χm ,
analogue to g, f r ,α,β , (r , α, β) ∈ V , and f m , m ∈ [M]. Moreover, let ◦gA,Bk ,
( ◦
f A, Bk
)r ,α,β ,( ◦
f A, Bk
)m , ( ẑA,Bk , χ̂
A,B
k ) and ((z
∗)A,Bk , (χ∗)
A,B




f r ,α,β , (r , α, β) ∈ V ,
◦
f m , m ∈ [M], ( ẑ, χ̂) and (z∗,χ∗). Then by Theorem 8.2 we derive lower and upper bounds
for the approximating systems in terms of those quantities. The following lemma compares
them to the original quantities.
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as well as lim supk→∞(χ̂ Ak )m ≥ χ̂m and lim infk→∞((χ Bk )∗)m ≤ (χ∗)m for all m ∈ [M].
Proof. For
◦





















h(z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF





s dF → 0, ∫ ◦
Dck
w+,r ,α dF → 0, (r , α) ∈ [R]×[T ], and ∫ ◦
Dck
xm dF → 0,m ∈
[M], as k → ∞. In particular, it must then hold that ∫ ◦
Dck
◦












h(z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF Ak = o(1),








h(z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF ≥ o(1).
(8.8)































h(z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )dFBk −
∫
D∞
h(z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF ≤ o(1).
(8.9)
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By (8.8) we can apply [18, Lemma EC. 2] (extend it by the z-dimensions) and thus derive
that lim infk→∞ ẑAk ≥ ẑ and lim infk→∞ χ̂ Ak ≥ χ̂ , where ( ẑAk , χ̂ Ak ) denotes the smallest joint
















hmf (z,χ;w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ )dF Ak (w−,w+, x, s, c, , τ ) − χm .
Now choose some δ > 0 and k large enough such that ( ẑAk , χ̂
A









k ) ≥ lim infk→∞
◦
gAk ((1 − δ)( ẑ, χ̂)) ≥ ◦g((1 − δ)( ẑ, χ̂))
and using lower semi-continuity of
◦










≥ ◦g( ẑ, χ̂).
For the second statement apply a small additional shock to the system in the sense that each
solvent institution defaults with probability ε > 0. Then the analogues of f r ,α,β and f m in
the shocked system are given by
f r ,α,βε (z,χ) = (1 − ε) f r ,α,β(z,χ) + ε(E[W+] − zr ,α,β),
f mε (z,χ) = (1 − ε) f m(z,χ) + ε(E[Xm] − χm).
Denote the analogues of (z∗,χ∗) for these functions by (z∗(ε),χ∗(ε)). Then using (8.9) for k
large enough it holds ( f Bk )
r ,α,β(z∗(ε),χ∗(ε)) ≤ f r ,α,β(z∗(ε),χ∗(ε))/2 < 0, (r , α, β) ∈ V ,
and ( f Bk )
m(z∗(ε),χ∗(ε)) ≤ f m(z∗(ε),χ∗(ε))/2 < 0,m ∈ [M]. Note that actually it is pos-
sible that f r ,α,β(z∗(ε),χ∗(ε)) = 0 resp. f m(z∗(ε),χ∗(ε)) = 0 if E[W+,r ,α1{A = β}] = 0
resp. E[Xm] = 0. In this case, however, the corresponding coordinates zr ,α,β resp. χm are
trivial and can be left out. Thus (z∗)Bk ≤ z∗(ε) and (χ∗)Bk ≤ χ∗(ε) componentwise and in




















We can then state the proof of the main theorem for general regular vertex sequences:
Proof of Theorem 3.3 For arbitrary ε > 0 we can apply Lemma 8.3 to derive
P
(



















g( ẑ, χ̂) − ε/2 for k large enough by Lemma 8.4 and then
P
(








− ◦gAk ( ẑAk , χ̂ Ak ) < −ε/2
)
.
Theorem 8.2 now yields
P
(
n−1Sn − ◦g( ẑ, χ̂) < −ε
) → 0, as n → ∞,
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and thus n−1Sn ≥ ◦g( ẑ, χ̂) + op(1) as ε > 0 was arbitrary. Similarly,










n − (χ̂ Ak )m < −ε/2
)
→ 0
as n → ∞ and hence χmn ≥ χ̂m + op(1) for all m ∈ [M].
In the same way, by Lemma 8.3
P
(








− g(z∗,χ∗) > ε
)




< g(z∗,χ∗) + ε/2 by Lemma 8.4.
Using Theorem 8.2 we thus conclude that
P
(









− gBk ((z∗)Bk , (χ∗)Bk ) > ε/2
)
→ 0, as n → ∞,
as well as










n − ((χ∗)Ak )m > ε/2
)
→ 0.
8.4 Proofs for Sect. 4
We keep the notation g, f r ,α,β , f m , z∗, χ∗, ◦g,
◦
f r ,α,β ,
◦
f m , ẑ and χ̂ for the quantities from
Sect. 3 for the unshocked system and add the index ·L to indicate the corresponding quantities
and functions in the system shocked by L .
Proof of Theorem 4.2 For arbitrary α > 0, we derive















⎠ ≥ C − L − X · h(χ)
⎞
⎠ 1{A = β}
⎤
⎦ − zr ,α,β















⎠ ≥ C(1 − α) − X · h(χ)
⎞
⎠ 1{A = β}
⎤
⎦ .
Using that E[L/C] < δ, we derive with Markov’s inequality that P(L ≥ αC) < δ/α and as
E[W+,r ,α] < ∞ it thus holds thatE[W+,r ,α1{L ≥ αC}] ≤ γ /3 for any arbitrary γ > 0 if we
choose δ > 0 small enough. Also the second summand in above inequality can be bounded
by f r ,α,β(z,χ)+γ /3 if α is chosen small enough using the dominated convergence theorem.
Let now (( z̃(γ ), χ̃(γ )))γ>0 ⊂ RV+,0 × RM+,0 be such that f r ,α,β( z̃(γ ), χ̃(γ )) = −γ for
all (r , α, β) ∈ V resp. f m( z̃(γ ), χ̃(γ )) = −γ for allm ∈ [M], which exists analogue to [18,
RemarkEC. 1] (extending it by the z-coordinates).By above result then f r ,α,βL ( z̃(γ ), χ̃(γ )) ≤−γ /3 < 0 for δ small enough. Similarly, one derives that f mL ( z̃(γ ), χ̃(γ )) ≤ −γ /3 < 0
for δ small enough. We can thus conclude that (z∗L ,χ∗L) < ( z̃(γ ), χ̃(γ )). However, by [18,
Remark EC. 1] we further know that ( z̃(γ ), χ̃(γ )) → (z∗,χ∗) and hence by upper semi-
continuity of g and possibly further decreasing δ it holds
g(z∗L ,χ∗L) ≤ g(z∗,χ∗) + ε/3 = ε/3. (8.10)
By similar means as for f r ,α,β and f m above, we also derive that gL(z,χ) ≤ ε/3+ g(z,χ)
for δ small enough. By Theorem 3.3 we can thus conclude that w.h.p.
n−1Sn,L ≤ gL(z∗L ,χ∗L) + ε/3 ≤ g(z∗L ,χ∗L) + 2ε/3 ≤ ε.
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Now let δ small enough such that also (χ∗L)m ≤ (χ∗)m + ε/2. Applying Theorem 3.3 we
thus derive that w.h.p.
χmn,L ≤ (χ∗L)m + ε/2 ≤ (χ∗)m + ε.
Proof of Theorem 4.6 Define for ε > 0 and IV ⊂ V resp. IM ⊂ [M] the set




(z,χ) ∈ RV+,0 × RM+,0 :
◦












(z,χ) ∈ RV+,0 × RM+,0 :
◦






(z,χ) ∈ RV+,0 × RM+,0 : χk ≥ E[Xk]
}
where we denote I cV := V \IV and I cM = [M]\IM . Moreover, denote by ( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) ∈
R
V+,0 × RM+,0 the smallest vector such that
◦
f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) = −ε for (r , α, β) ∈ IV
and ẑs,θ,λ(ε, I ) = E[W+,r ,α1{A = β}] for (s, θ, λ) ∈ I cV resp.
◦
f m( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) = −ε
for m ∈ IM and χ̂k(ε, I ) = E[Xk] for k ∈ I cM . The existence of such a vector is ensured
analogue to Lemma 3.2. In particular, it then holds ( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) ∈ T (ε, I ) and by the
construction of ( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) analogue to Lemma 3.2 we obtain that ( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) ≤
(z,χ) for any other (z,χ) ∈ T (ε, I )
In particular, this implies that ( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) is non-decreasing in ε and thus continuous
for almost every ε > 0. As moreover, the expressions f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) + ẑr ,α,β(ε, I )
and f m( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) + χ̂m(ε, I ) are bounded and increasing in ε, we derive that for
almost every ε > 0 and δ > 0, we can choose γ > 0 small enough such that
f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) + ẑr ,α,β(ε, I )
≤ f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε − γ, I ), χ̂(ε − γ, I )) + ẑr ,α,β(ε − γ, I ) + δ
and
f m( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) + χ̂m(ε, I ) ≤ f m( ẑ(ε − γ, I ), χ̂(ε − γ, I )) + χ̂m(ε − γ, I ) + δ.
If (r , α, β) ∈ IV , as ẑ(ε, I ) is strictly increasing, we derive that
◦
f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) ≤ f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I ))
≤ f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε − γ, I ), χ̂(ε − γ, I )) + δ
≤ f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε − γ, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) + δ
≤ ◦f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) + δ
and choosing δ arbitrarily small we conclude that for almost every ε > 0,
f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) = ◦f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) = −ε.
Moreover, if m ∈ IM , then χ̂m(ε, I ) is strictly increasing and by the assumption of hm(χ)
being strictly increasing in χm , we derive for xm > 0 that
ρα
(
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entry-wise for all α ∈ [T ]. Hence similarly as above, f m( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) = ◦f m( ẑ(ε, I ),
χ̂(ε, I )) = −ε.
Let us now show that (z∗,χ∗) ≤ ( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )). To this end, suppose that we could
choose some (z,χ) ∈ P0 such that zr ,α,β > ẑr ,α,β(ε, I ) for some (r , α, β) ∈ V or χm >
χ̂(ε, I ) for some m ∈ [M]. Then by P0 ⊂ [0, ζ ] × [0, η], where ζ r ,α,β = E[W+,r ,α1{A =
β}] and ηm = E[Xm], andmonotonicity of the functions f r ,α,β resp. f m wewould derive the
existence of a point P0  ( z̃, χ̃) ≤ ( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) such that either z̃r ,α,β = ẑr ,α,β(ε, I )
for some (r , α, β) ∈ IV or χ̃m = χ̂M (ε, I ) for some m ∈ IM . But then f r ,α,β( z̃, χ̃) ≤
f r ,α,β( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) = −ε resp. f m( z̃, χ̃) ≤ f m( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) = −ε and thus a
contradiction to ( z̃, χ̃) ∈ P0. It must therefore hold (z∗,χ∗) ≤ ( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )). Let now
for given shock L ,
IM := {m ∈ [M] : χ̂mL < E[Xm]} and IV := {(r , α, β) ∈ V : ẑr ,α,βL < E[W+,r ,α1{A = β}].
If IV = ∅ and IM = ∅ the result is trivial, so assume that either IV = ∅ or IM = ∅.
For m ∈ IM , using
◦
f mL ( ẑL , χ̂ L) = 0 we then derive by independence of L/C and
(W−,W+, X, S,C, A)
◦
f m( ẑL , χ̂ L) =
◦
f mL ( ẑL , χ̂ L) − P(L = 2C)(E[Xm] − χ̂mL )
P(L = 0) < 0
and analogously
◦






f r ,α,β( ẑL , χ̂ L), max
m∈IM
◦
f m( ẑL , χ̂ L)
}
> 0
it then holds ( ẑL , χ̂ L) ∈ T (ε, I ) and further ( ẑL , χ̂ L) ≥ ( ẑ(ε, I ), χ̂(ε, I )) ≥ (z∗,χ∗). We
can then apply Theorem 3.3 and conclude
n−1Sn,L ≥ ◦gL( ẑL , χ̂ L) + op(1) ≥ ◦g(z∗,χ∗) + op(1)
as well as
χmn,L ≥ χ̂mL + op(1) ≥ (χ∗)m + op(1).
Glossary
o(1) the Landau notation for a term that converges to 0 (e.g. as
n → ∞)
op(1) the Landau notation for a term that converges to 0 in
probability (e.g. as n → ∞)
R+,0, R+,∞ positive real numbers with 0 resp. ∞
[a, b] cuboid spanned by vectors a, b ∈ Rd consisting of all
x ∈ Rd such that ai ≤ xi ≤ bi , i = 1, . . . , d
n ∈ N number of banks in the system
M ∈ N number of assets/asset classes
[n] = {1, . . . , n} set of banks
xmi ∈ R+,0 number of shares of asset m ∈ [M] held by bank i ∈ [n]
xi = (x1i , . . . , xMi ) ∈ RM+,0 vector of asset holdings of bank i ∈ [n]
ci ∈ R+,∞ equity of bank i ∈ [n]
i ∈ R+,0 exogenous losses of bank i ∈ [n]
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i ∈ R+,0 ∈ R+,0 in- resp. out-weight of bank i ∈ [n] towards bank of type
α ∈ [T ]
w−i = (w−,1i , . . . , w−,Ti ) ∈ RT+,0 vector of in-weights of bank i ∈ [n] towards banks of
types α = 1, . . . , T
w+i = (w+,1i , . . . , w+,Ti ) ∈ RT+,0 vector of out-weights of bank i ∈ [n] towards banks of
types α = 1, . . . , T
Xri, j indicator random variable for an edge of size r ∈ [R]
going from bank i ∈ [n] to bank j ∈ [n]
(W−n ,W+n , Xn, Sn,Cn, An) random vector distributed according to the empirical dis-
tribution of {(w−i ,w+i , xi , si , ci , i )}i∈[n]
(W−,W+, X, S,C, A) limit in distribution of (W−n ,W+n , Xn, Sn,Cn, An)
ρβ : R+,0 → [0, 1]M non-decreasing, right-continuous sale functions for each
type β ∈ [T ]
◦
ρβ(u) = limε→0+ ρβ((1 − ε)u) left-continuous modification of ρβ, β ∈ [T ]
hm : RM+,0 → [0, 1] non-decreasing (componentwise) relative loss function
of asset m ∈ [M]
h(y) = (h1(y), . . . , hM (y)) vector of loss functions
χn ∈ RM+,0 vector of finally sold shares divided by n
Dn ⊂ [n] set of finally defaulted banks Yr ,β := ∑γ∈[T ] W−,r ,γ
zr ,β,γ , r ∈ [R], β ∈ [T ],
Qs ∼ Poi(qs), s ∈ [R] Independent Poisson for {qs}s∈[R] ⊂ R+,0












s∈[R] sQs + 
c
)]
, α ∈ [T ].
ψ(z,χ;w−, x, c, ) = P (Poi(w−z) ≥ c −  − x · h(χ))




Poi(w−z) +  + x · h(χ)
c
)]












































(z,χ) ∈ RV+,0 × RM+,0 : f m(z,χ) ≥ 0
}
P0 connected component of P containing 0
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(z∗,χ∗) ∈ RT 2+M+,0 largest joint root of the functions f m,m ∈ [M], f r ,α,β , (r , α, β) ∈ V in P0
◦





s∈[R] sQs + 
c
)]


















































(z,χ) ∈ RV+,0 × RM+,0 : f m(z,χ) ≥ 0
}
◦
P0 connected component of
◦
P containing 0
( ẑ, χ̂) ∈ RT 2+M+,0 smallest joint root of the functions
◦
f m , m ∈ [M]0
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